Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems 1 1 We are grateful to many co

In an electrophotographic copying machine of the type which transfers an electrostatic latent image formed on a photosensitive element, usually comprising a conductive base and a photoconductive layer thereon, onto a recording member, an electric dust collector is provided to clean the air flowing in the vicinity of a corona discharger and the photosensitive member. In order to direct the dust-free air, there is provided an air flow passage and a blower such as a fan. The corona discharger and the electric dust collector may be constructed integrally or separately. All of the air in the copying machine may be made dust-free.

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