论文信息 - Indirect co-evolution for understanding belief in an incomplete information dynamic game

Indirect co-evolution for understanding belief in an incomplete information dynamic game

This study aims to design a new co-evolution algorithm, Mixture Co-evolution which enables modeling of integration and composition of direct co-evolution and it indirect co-evolution. This algorithm is applied to investigate properties of players' belief and of information incompleteness in a dynamic game.

Nanlin Jin

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