The political economy of international organizations

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the details of decision-making in IOs the literature shows that a focus on states as the prime actors in IOs overlooks important facets of the empirical reality. Mainly focusing on empirical research, we structure the paper according to the four main actors involved and examine how they influence, use, and shape IOs. We find that IO behavior often reflects the interests of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups, while the impact of voters is limited. The final section discusses proposals for reforms addressing this weak representation of voter preferences.

[1]  J. Vreeland.  The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor , 2002 .

[2]  R. Stone.  The Scope of IMF Conditionality , 2008, International Organization.

[3]  K. Michaelowa,et al.  Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness? , 2005 .

[4]  Todd Sandler,et al.  On the Economic Theory of Alliances , 1975 .

[5]  J. Sturm,et al.  The case for the central bank independence , 1992 .

[6]  N. Woods.  The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers , 2006 .

[7]  J. M. Macpherson,et al.  The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy: The decision to privatize: economists and the construction of ideas and policies , 2008 .

[8]  Jong‐Wha Lee,et al.  IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects? , 2002 .

[9]  Alexander Wendt.  Constructing International Politics , 1995 .

[10]  Bessma Momani.  Limits on streamlining Fund conditionality: the International Monetary Fund's organizational culture , 2005 .

[11]  J. Ruggie.  The False Premise of Realism , 1995 .

[12]  B. Frey.  The public choice view of international political economy , 1984, International Organization.

[13]  K. Michaelowa,et al.  Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure , 2003 .

[14]  Mark A. Pollack.  The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU , 2003 .

[15]  R. K. Fleck,et al.  World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of Us Influence , 2006 .

[16]  Axel Dreher,et al.  Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Us Interests on IMF Conditions , 2005 .

[17]  David Marquand.  Parliament for Europe , 1979 .

[18]  M. Mayo.  The New Transnational Activism , 2006 .

[19]  J. Joyce,et al.  Many Happy Returns? Recidivism and the IMF , 2000 .

[20]  K. Derviş,et al.  A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform , 2005 .

[21]  L. Hooghe.  Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? , 1999 .

[22]  B. Frey,et al.  Competing models of international lending activity , 1986 .

[23]  R. Vaubel.  The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union , 2008 .

[24]  R. Vaubel.  The European Institutions as an Interest Group: The Dynamics of Ever-Closer Union , 2009 .

[25]  W. Jacoby,et al.  Delegation and Agency in International Organizations: How agents matter , 2006 .

[26]  James M. Rubenstein,et al.  The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy , 2008 .

[27]  Francesca Polletta,et al.  Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics , 1998 .

[28]  Ann Florini,et al.  The coming democracy : new rules for running a new world , 2003 .

[29]  L. Hooghe,et al.  The European Commission and the Integration of Europe , 2002 .

[30]  E. Werker,et al.  What Do Non-Governmental Organizations Do? , 2007 .

[31]  Michael Zürn,et al.  Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems , 2004, Government and Opposition.

[32]  J. Joachim.  Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights , 2003 .

[33]  R. Calland,et al.  The right to know, the right to live : access to information and socio-economic justice , 2002 .

[34]  H. Triandis,et al.  A Method for Determining Cultural, Demographic, and Personal Constructs , 1990 .

[35]  Mathew D. McCubbins,et al.  Delegation and Agency in International Organizations: The logic of delegation to international organizations , 2006 .

[36]  A. Moravcsik,et al.  Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism , 2009, International Organization.

[37]  R. Price.  Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines , 1998, International Organization.

[38]  Kenneth W. Abbott,et al.  Why States Act through Formal International Organizations , 1998 .

[39]  R. Dahl.  Democracy's Edges: Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view , 1999 .

[40]  Tim Büthe,et al.  Delegation and Agency in International Organizations , 2007, Perspectives on Politics.

[41]  Stefan Hedlund.  Lending Credibility : The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition , 2003 .

[42]  J. Polak.  The changing nature of IMF conditionality , 1991 .

[43]  The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the E.U , 2004, Perspectives on Politics.

[44]  D. Coen.  Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying , 2007 .

[45]  E. Mansfield,et al.  Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements , 2002, International Organization.

[46]  N. Potrafke,et al.  Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly , 2009 .

[47]  Charles Merrifeld.  After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy , 1985 .

[48]  A. Dreher,et al.  Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council , 2009 .

[49]  Robert O. Keohane,et al.  After Hegemony , 2005 .

[50]  J. Nye.  Globalization’s democratic deficit: how to make international institutions more accountable , 2001 .

[51]  Ben-Gurion.  The Political Economy of Transnational Regimes : The Case of Human Rights , 2008 .

[52]  R. Gilpin.  Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order , 2001 .

[53]  Cheryl Shanks,et al.  Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations, 1981–1992 , 1996, International Organization.

[54]  Jeffrey M. Chwieroth.  Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization , 2010 .

[55]  Bessma Momani.  Recruiting and diversifying IMF technocrats , 2005 .

[56]  R. Carroll,et al.  Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations , 2015 .

[57]  R. Vaubel.  A public choice approach to international organization , 1986 .

[58]  A. Dreher,et al.  Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions? , 2007 .

[59]  Dahl,et al.  A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation , 1994 .

[60]  G. Worswick.,et al.  Economic Growth and Stability. , 1975 .

[61]  J. Vreeland.  The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat? , 1999 .

[62]  Erica R. Gould.  Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality and Supplementary Financiers , 2006 .

[63]  Ian Hurd.  Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics , 1999, International Organization.

[64]  Eric Werker,et al.  How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations , 2006, Journal of Political Economy.

[65]  R. Posner,et al.  The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective , 1975, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[66]  B. Frey,et al.  Strengthening the citizens' role in international organizations , 2006 .

[67]  L. Hooghe.  Euro-Socialists or Euro-Marketeers? EU Top Officials on Capitalism , 2000, The Journal of Politics.

[68]  Kathryn Sikkink,et al.  Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics , 1999 .

[69]  S. Greer,et al.  The Changing World of European Health Lobbies , 2008 .

[70]  M. Finnemore,et al.  The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations , 1999, International Organization.

[71]  I. Clark.  Inside the IMF: comparisons with policy-making organizations in Canadian governments , 1996 .

[72]  Christopher Kilby,et al.  Supervision and Performance : The Case of World Bank Projects , 2000 .

[73]  Marcel Fratzscher,et al.  IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets - A Political Economy Analysis , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[74]  C. Kupchan,et al.  The Promise of Collective Security , 1995 .

[75]  W. Maloney,et al.  Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know? , 2008 .

[76]  J. Gray.  International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk , 2009 .

[77]  W. Bean.  Parkinson's Law, and Other Studies in Administration. , 1958 .

[78]  A. Dreher,et al.  Membership has Its Privileges - The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[79]  David Colander.  The Making of an Economist, Redux , 2007 .

[80]  M. Cowles.  Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992 , 1995 .

[81]  Kristina Charrad.  Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, Dynamics and Trends , 2005 .

[82]  Marc T. Law,et al.  The Political Economy of , 2006 .

[83]  S. Rickard.  Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements , 2010 .

[84]  Jessica Einhorn,et al.  The World Bank's Mission Creep , 2001 .

[85]  J. Broz,et al.  Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund , 2006, International Organization.

[86]  A. Moravcsik.  The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe , 2000, International Organization.

[87]  A. Dreher,et al.  The political economy of IMF forecasts , 2008 .

[88]  E. Werker,et al.  Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance , 2010 .

[89]  M. Steinwand,et al.  The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence , 2008 .

[90]  Axel Dreher,et al.  Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions , 2007, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[91]  W. Shughart,et al.  The Elgar Companion to Public Choice , 2003 .

[92]  Neve Gordon,et al.  The Political Economy of Transnational Regimes: The Case of Human Rights , 2008 .

[93]  J. Broz.  Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions , 2007 .

[94]  R. Carpenter,et al.  Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks , 2007 .

[95]  Bruno S. Frey,et al.  Outside and inside competition for international organizations—from analysis to innovations , 2008 .

[96]  Cornelia Woll.  Trade policy lobbying in the European Union: Who captures whom? Cornelia Woll , 2006 .

[97]  Jon C. Pevehouse,et al.  With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy , 2002 .

[98]  Elizabeth A. Bloodgood.  The interest group analogy: international non-governmental advocacy organisations in international politics , 2010, Review of International Studies.

[99]  Christopher Kilby.  Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank , 2006 .

[100]  Strom C. Thacker,et al.  The High Politics of IMF Lending , 1999, World Politics.

[101]  R. Vaubel.  The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending , 1983 .

[102]  S. Schwartz,et al.  Toward A Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values , 1987 .

[103]  D. Tingley,et al.  The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy , 2012, The Review of International Organizations.

[104]  D. Mueller.  Public Choice III: What have we learned? , 1979 .

[105]  Lisa L. Martin,et al.  The Promise of Institutionalist Theory , 1995 .

[106]  S. Babb,et al.  The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO , 2009 .

[107]  L. Hooghe.  Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission , 2005, International Organization.

[108]  T. Preston.  Choosing not to choose. , 1986, Medical world news.

[109]  A. Dreher,et al.  Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis , 2003 .

[110]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[111]  R. Vaubel.  Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union , 1999 .

[112]  Claudia Kissling,et al.  Civil society participation in European and global governance : a cure for the democratic deficit? , 2008 .

[113]  Irfan Nooruddin,et al.  The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending , 2006, International Organization.

[114]  Christine Mahoney,et al.  Brussels Versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union , 2008 .

[115]  Francisco Ferreira,et al.  Theory and Evidence , 2009 .

[116]  S. Voigt,et al.  Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers , 2002 .

[117]  R. Vaubel.  Principal-agent problems in international organizations , 2006 .

[118]  J. Busby,et al.  Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics , 2007 .

[119]  Axel Dreher,et al.  Country or Leader? Political Change and UN General Assembly Voting , 2009 .

[120]  D. Archibugi.  The Global Commonwealth of Citizens , 2008 .

[121]  J. Reynaud,et al.  Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities , 2009 .

[122]  R. Cox,et al.  Decision Making Within International Organisations , 2004 .

[123]  J. Vreeland.  IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies , 2006 .

[124]  M. Barnett,et al.  Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations , 2005 .

[125]  Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments' Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers , 2008 .

[126]  R. Eising.  The Political Economy of State-Business Relations in Europe: Interest Mediation, Capitalism and EU Policy Making , 2009 .

[127]  M. Finnemore,et al.  International Norm Dynamics and Political Change , 1998, International Organization.

[128]  J. E. Schwartzberg.  Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations Reform , 2003 .

[129]  Christopher Kilby.  The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements , 2009 .

[130]  B. Frey,et al.  The public choice of international organizations , 1996 .

[131]  Jack Santa Barbara,et al.  the false promise of , 2007 .

[132]  Jeffrey M. Chwieroth.  Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets , 2007, International Organization.

[133]  S. Schwartz.  Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values , 1994 .

[134]  Antje Vetterlein.  Owning Development: Lacking ownership: the IMF and its engagement with social development as a policy norm , 2010 .

[135]  Allan Drazen,et al.  Political Economy in Macroeconomics , 2018 .

[136]  Magdalena Bexell,et al.  Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors , 2010 .

[137]  E. Hafner-Burton.  Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem , 2008, International Organization.

[138]  Richard A. Falk,et al.  Toward Global Parliament , 2001 .

[139]  M. Fratianni,et al.  The Economics Of International Organizations , 1982 .

[140]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy , 2000 .

[141]  R. Eising.  The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards élite pluralism? , 2007 .

[142]  A. Moravcsik,et al.  Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics , 1997, International Organization.

[143]  Mark Copelovitch.  Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending , 2009 .

[144]  R. Vaubel.  The political economy of centralization and the European Community , 1992 .

[145]  Frank-Oliver Aldenhoff.  Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis , 2007 .