Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps

Two experiments were conducted to evaluate the effects of two variables on psychological entrapment. Experiment 1 was an incrementing counter paradigm in which subjects could quit at any time. Subjects paid for each tick of their counter hoping that cash might eventually be awarded—either because a computer-generated number was reached or because a presumed adversary chose to quit first. At each of a series of decision points, subjects were to indicate their wish to continue, either by signalling the experimenter or doing nothing. In Experiment 2, subjects solved a crossword puzzle in the presumed presence of a person with whom they were either independent or in competition. Subjects were either stopped periodically and asked if they wished to continue or were not interrupted. In Experiment 1 it was found that entrapment was greater under Social than Nonsocial conditions; in both experiments this difference was more striking for men than women. In addition, in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, entrapment was greater under Passive than Active conditions. Reasons for the similarity and divergence of results across the two studies are discussed and related to prior research.

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