论文信息 - How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?

How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?

Abstract Assuming the IC conjecture, we show that, for any faithful scoring rule, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, the probability that a random profile will be manipulable for a coalition of size Cn α , with 0≤ α C constant, is of order O (1/ n 1/2− α ).

Arkadii M. Slinko | A. Slinko

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