On the foundation of stability

The concept of stability à la von Neumann and Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decision-theoretic foundation of stability, by establishing epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction.

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