Game Theoretic Pragmatics
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Michael Franke,et al. On Scales, Salience and Referential Language Use , 2011, Amsterdam Colloquium on Logic, Language and Meaning.
[2] C. Morris. Signs, Language and Behavior , 1947 .
[3] J. Hofbauer,et al. Evolutionary game dynamics , 2011 .
[4] Joost Zwarts,et al. Conflicts in Interpretation , 2010 .
[5] Asa Kasher,et al. Conversational Maxims and Rationality , 1976 .
[6] Rudi van Drunen,et al. Localization of Random Pulse Point Sources Using Physically Implementable Search Algorithms , 2020, Optoelectronics, Instrumentation and Data Processing.
[7] Reinhard Blutner,et al. Lexical Pragmatics , 1998, J. Semant..
[8] P. Taylor,et al. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .
[9] K. D. Jaegher,et al. Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule , 2008 .
[10] S. Neale. Paul Grice and the philosophy of language , 1992 .
[11] W. Quine,et al. Philosophy of mathematics: Truth by convention , 1984 .
[12] Jörgen W. Weibull,et al. Evolutionary Game Theory , 1996 .
[13] Robert van Rooij,et al. Cooperative versus argumentative communication , 2004 .
[14] Gerald Gazdar,et al. A solution to the projection problem , 1979 .
[15] David F. Sally. Risky speech: behavioral game theory and pragmatics , 2003 .
[16] Christopher Potts. Interpretive Economy, Schelling Points, and evolutionary stability ∗ , 2008 .
[17] A. Rubinstein. Economics and Language , 1999 .
[18] Thomas C. Scott-Phillips,et al. The Evolution of Relevance , 2010, Cogn. Sci..
[19] M. Nowak,et al. Unifying evolutionary dynamics. , 2002, Journal of theoretical biology.
[20] Corien Bary,et al. Temporal anaphora across and inside sentences: The function of participles , 2011 .
[21] M. Nowak. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life , 2006 .
[22] Tomoko Matsui,et al. Recent approaches to bridging: truth, coherence, relevance , 2000 .
[23] Colin Camerer. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction , 2003 .
[24] Robert van Rooij,et al. Explaining quantity implicatures , 2007, TARK '07.
[25] Michael Franke,et al. Semantic Meaning and Pragmatic Inference in Non-cooperative Conversation , 2008, ESSLLI Student Sessions.
[26] Michael Franke,et al. SIGNALING CONVENTIONS: WHO LEARNS WHAT WHERE AND WHEN IN A SOCIAL NETWORK? , 2012 .
[27] Anton Benz,et al. Utility and Relevance of Answers , 2006 .
[28] Andreas Blume,et al. Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication , 1993 .
[29] Michael Franke,et al. On Scales, Salience & Referential Language Use , 2012 .
[30] G. Szabó,et al. Evolutionary games on graphs , 2006, cond-mat/0607344.
[31] Dirk Helbing,et al. A stochastic behavioral model and a ‘Microscopic’ foundation of evolutionary game theory , 1996, cond-mat/9805340.
[32] Luc Steels,et al. The synthetic modeling of language origins , 1997 .
[33] Prashant Parikh,et al. A Game-Theoretic Account of Implicature , 1992, TARK.
[34] Reinhard Blutner,et al. Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation , 2000, J. Semant..
[35] Peter Vanderschraaf,et al. Convention as correlated equilibrium , 1995 .
[36] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans , 1989 .
[37] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .
[38] K. Tuyls,et al. The evolutionary language game: an orthogonal approach. , 2005, Journal of theoretical biology.
[39] Robin Clark,et al. Game theory and discourse anaphora , 2007, J. Log. Lang. Inf..
[40] Patrick Grim,et al. Simulating Grice - Emergent Pragmatics in Spatialized Game Theory , 2011, Language, Games, and Evolution.
[41] A. Grafen. Biological signals as handicaps. , 1990, Journal of theoretical biology.
[42] Robert van Rooy. Questioning to Resolve Decision Problems , 2003 .
[43] N. Cocchiarella,et al. Situations and Attitudes. , 1986 .
[44] R. Kirk. CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY , 1970 .
[45] Michael Franke,et al. Signal to act : game theory in pragmatics , 2009 .
[46] Arthur Merin,et al. Information, relevance, and social decisionmaking: some principles and results of decision-theoretic semantics , 1999 .
[47] R. Cressman. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games , 2003 .
[48] Prashant Parikh. The use of language , 2001 .
[49] R. Selten. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.
[50] Vittorio Loreto,et al. Mathematical Modeling of Language Games , 2010, Evolution of Communication and Language in Embodied Agents.
[51] M. Nowak. Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.
[52] D. Fox. Free Choice and the Theory of Scalar Implicatures , 2007 .
[53] Wang Ai. On Experimental Pragmatics , 2008 .
[54] R. Selten. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts. , 1980, Journal of theoretical biology.
[55] Kevin J. S. Zollman. Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning* , 2005, Philosophy of Science.
[56] G. Chierchia,et al. The Grammatical View of Scalar Implicatures and the Relationship between Semantics and Pragmatics , 2008 .
[57] Matthew Rabin,et al. A Model of Pre-game Communication , 1991 .
[58] Robert van Rooy,et al. Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange , 2003, J. Log. Lang. Inf..
[59] A. Perea. Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice , 2012 .
[60] Laurence R. Horn,et al. On the semantic properties of logical operators in english' reproduced by the indiana university lin , 1972 .
[61] Daniel Taylor,et al. Evolution of the social contract , 2014 .
[62] M. Spence. Job Market Signaling , 1973 .
[63] J M Smith,et al. Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .
[64] Robert Stalnaker. Saying and Meaning, Cheap Talk and Credibility , 2006 .
[65] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debate: An Expository Note , 2006 .
[66] Joseph Farrell. Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games , 1993 .
[67] R. Aumann,et al. Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium , 1995 .
[68] Michael Franke,et al. Optimality-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to Implicature , 2006 .
[69] Luc Steels,et al. A Self-Organizing Spatial Vocabulary , 1995, Artificial Life.
[70] D. Sperber,et al. Relevance: Communication and cognition, 2nd ed. , 1995 .
[71] R.A.M. van Rooij. Evolution of conventional meaning and conversational principles , 2004 .
[72] R. Rooij. Games and Quantity implicatures , 2008 .
[73] Prashant Parikh. Communication, Meaning, and Interpretation , 2000 .
[74] K. D. Jaegher. The evolution of Horn's rule , 2008 .
[75] M. Nowak,et al. Evolutionary game theory , 1995, Current Biology.
[76] Henk Zeevat,et al. Optimality-theoretic pragmatics , 2009 .
[77] Elliott O. Wagner,et al. Communication and Structured Correlation , 2009 .
[78] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Game theory in semantics and pragmatics , 2012 .
[79] T. Schelling,et al. The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .
[80] J. Anscombre,et al. L'argumentation dans la langue , 1976 .
[81] Julia Hirschberg,et al. A theory of scalar implicature , 1985 .
[82] Joel Sobel,et al. Signaling Games , 2009, Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.
[83] Duncan J. Watts,et al. Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks , 1998, Nature.
[84] Michael Franke,et al. Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games , 2012, J. Log. Lang. Inf..
[85] Albert,et al. Emergence of scaling in random networks , 1999, Science.
[86] Tilman Börgers,et al. Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics , 1997 .
[87] M. Rabin. Communication between Rational Agents , 1990 .
[88] A. Zahavi. Mate selection-a selection for a handicap. , 1975, Journal of theoretical biology.
[89] Jon Barwise,et al. Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems , 1997 .
[90] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Game-Theoretical Pragmatics , 2010 .
[91] S. Levinson. Presumptive Meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature , 2001 .
[92] Kevin J. S. Zollman,et al. Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling , 2007, Synthese.
[93] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Game Theory and Pragmatics , 2005 .
[94] Ángel Sánchez,et al. Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics , 2009, Physics of life reviews.
[95] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. , 2008, Journal of theoretical biology.
[96] Gerald Gazdar,et al. Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form , 1978 .
[97] Jonas Schreiber,et al. The Analysis of Mind , 1935, Nature.
[98] Simon M. Huttegger. Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning* , 2007, Philosophy of Science.
[99] Prashant Parikh,et al. Communication and strategic inference , 1991 .
[100] Robert van Rooy,et al. Bi-Directional Optimality Theory: An Application of Game Theory , 2000, J. Semant..
[101] Prashant Parikh,et al. Language and Equilibrium , 2010 .
[102] G. Jäger,et al. Evolutionary Game Theory and Typology: A Case Study , 2007 .
[103] Prashant Parikh,et al. Pragmatics and Games of Partial Information , 2006 .
[104] Roland Mühlenbernd,et al. Learning with neighbours , 2011, Synthese.
[105] Territoire Urbain,et al. Convention , 1955, Hidden Nature.
[106] J. Sobel,et al. STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .
[107] W. Bruce Croft,et al. Language Is a Complex Adaptive System: Position Paper , 2009 .
[108] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Applications of Game Theory in Linguistics , 2008, Lang. Linguistics Compass.
[109] M A Nowak,et al. The evolution of language. , 1999, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[110] R. Aumann. Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies , 1974 .
[111] J. Morgan,et al. Cheap Talk , 2005 .
[112] K. Schlag. Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits , 1998 .
[113] R. Rooij,et al. Optimal assertions, and what they implicate. A uniform game theoretic approach , 2007 .
[114] Michael Franke,et al. Quantity implicatures, exhaustive interpretation, and rational conversation , 2011 .
[115] J. Mill,et al. An examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy , 1979 .
[116] Michael Franke,et al. Relevance in Cooperation and Conflict , 2012, J. Log. Comput..
[117] Robert Gibbons,et al. A primer in game theory , 1992 .
[118] Nicholas Allott,et al. Game Theory and Communication , 2006 .
[119] J. Bernardo. Expected Information as Expected Utility , 1979 .
[120] Siobhan Chapman. Paul Grice: Philosopher and Linguist , 2005 .
[121] Gerhard Jäger,et al. Game-Theoretical Pragmatics (Update of Chapter 8) , 2011 .
[122] Robert Stalnaker. On the evaluation of solution concepts , 1994 .
[123] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .
[124] Robert van Rooy,et al. SIGNALLING GAMES SELECT HORN STRATEGIES , 2004 .
[125] 木村 和夫. Pragmatics , 1997, Language Teaching.
[126] Martin J. Osborne,et al. An Introduction to Game Theory , 2003 .
[127] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .
[128] H. Grice. Logic and conversation , 1975 .