Evolutionary pressures and a stable world for animals and robots: A commentary on Merker

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, asserts that "Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions-the world ..." and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker's ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible objections to his evolutionary pressure claim.

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