A Method for Implementing Counterfactual Experiments in Models with Multiple Equilibria

This paper proposes a homotopy method for implementing counterfactual experiments in empirical models with multiple equilibria. A key assumption is that the equilibrium selection function does not jump discontinuously between equilibria as we continuously change the structural parameters.

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