Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting

Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function, as well as envy-free. We consider a different type of manipulations; each agent might create fake identities to cheat the mechanism. Such manipulation have been called Sybils or false-name manipulations, and designing robust mechanisms against them, i.e., false-name-proof, is a challenging problem in mechanism design literature. We first show that no randomized false-name-proof cake cutting mechanism simultaneously satisfies ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency We then propose a new randomized mechanism that is optimal in terms of worst-case loss among those that satisfy false-name-proofness, ex-post envy-freeness, and a new weaker efficiency property. However, it reduces the amount of allocations for an agent exponentially with respect to the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we provide another new cake cutting mechanism that satisfies a weaker notion of false-name-proofness, as well as ex-post envy freeness and Pareto efficiency.