Short Paper: On High-Assurance Information-Flow-Secure Programming Languages

We argue that high-assurance systems require high-assurance information-flow-secure programming languages. As a step towards such languages, we present the, to our knowledge, first concurrent theory of information flow security that supports (1) compositional reasoning under dynamic assumptions, and (2) value-dependent classification, to handle the dynamism inherent in modern high-assurance systems. We sketch out our vision and a roadmap for building self-certifying information-flow-secure programming languages.

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