Measuring satisfaction and power in influence based decision systems

Abstract We introduce collective decision-making models associated with influence spread under the linear threshold model in social networks. We define the oblivious and the non-oblivious influence models. We also introduce the generalized opinion leader–follower model (gOLF) as an extension of the opinion leader–follower model (OLF) proposed by van den Brink et al. (2011). In our model we allow rules for the final decision different from the simple majority used in OLF. We show that gOLF models are non-oblivious influence models on a two-layered bipartite influence digraph. Together with OLF models, the satisfaction and the power measures were introduced and studied. We analyze the computational complexity of those measures for the decision models introduced in the paper. We show that the problem of computing the satisfaction or the power measure is #P-hard in all the introduced models even when the subjacent social network is a bipartite graph. Complementing this result, we provide two subfamilies of decision models in which both measures can be computed in polynomial time. We show that the collective decision functions are monotone and therefore they define an associated simple game. We relate the satisfaction and the power measures with the Rae index and the Banzhaf value of an associated simple game. This will allow the use of known approximation methods for computing the Banzhaf value, or the Rae index to their practical computation.

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