Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework

A framework for tax compliance is suggested in which both the power of tax authorities and trust in the tax authorities are relevant dimensions for understanding enforced and voluntary compliance. Dynamic interactions between power and trust are considered. Using the framework as a conceptual tool, factors studied in previous research, such as fines, audit probabilities, tax rate, knowledge, attitudes, norms and fairness are reviewed and discussed with reference to the power and trust dimensions. Using the framework as an operational tool, approaches of responsive regulation to increase tax compliance are discussed.

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