A Deployed Quantal Response-Based Patrol Planning System for the U.S. Coast Guard
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Bo An | Rong Yang | Milind Tambe | Fernando Ordóñez | Eric Anyung Shieh | Craig Baldwin | Joseph DiRenzo | Kathryn Moretti | Ben Maule | Garrett Meyer | Milind Tambe | F. Ordóñez | Bo An | E. Shieh | Rong Yang | C. Baldwin | Joseph DiRenzo | Ben Maule | G. Meyer | Kathryn Moretti
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