Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance: The Role of Shareholder Numbers, Contest for Control, and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms

Abstract The principal–principal (PP) perspective of corporate governance shows that multiple large shareholder (MLS) structure has competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. We argue that the dominant effect depends on contest for control among large shareholders and the number of large shareholders involved. Using data from Chinese family listed companies from 2004 to 2007, this study shows inverse U-shaped relationships between contest for control and corporate market value, as measured by Tobin's Q, and between the number of large shareholders and corporate market value. Findings indicate that at low to medium levels of contest for control or number of large shareholders, formal institutions can strengthen MLS structure's monitoring effect and can help this effect last longer. As a whole, the findings extend the institution-based view in the context of family corporate governance by showing that formal institutions can shape the ability of MLS structure to exert governance. 摘要 公司治理领域的双委托人视角指出，多个大股东结构具有监督与堑壕两种竞争的治理效应。本文分析认为，多个大股东结构的占优治理效应取决于大股东间的控制权竞争 程度以及大股东的个数。基于中国家族控股上市公司2004^2007年的样本数据，本文发现控制权竞争程度与以Tobin's 度量的公司市场价值间存在一种倒U型关系，而且这种关系也存在于大股东个数与公司市场价值间。进一歩的研究发现当控制权竞争程度或大股东个数处于低至中等水平时，正式的制度环境能够增强并延长多个大股东结构的监督效应。简言之，本文通过阐明正式的制度环境能够塑造多个大股东结构发挥治理作用的能力，扩展了家族企业治理领域的制度基础观研究。

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