China's "Punitive" War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment

THE CHINESE "SELF-DEFENSE counterattack" into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) on February 17, 1979 may prove to be a turning point in -the history of the Marxist-Leninist movement. It was the first invasion of a communist country by another without any pretence of an ideological justification, or "invitation" by that country's people. Moreover, it flies in the face of the Maoist doctrine of Third World solidarity.1 Such long-ranging issues deserve careful consideration, and will be touched on in this article. The events are still so recent, however, and so many critical facts remain unknown, that the full political implications cannot yet be discerned. Instead, this article will concentrate on a single issue: What does the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 indicate about the military capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC)? This issue needs to be addressed, if for no other reason, because a widening circle of writers and decision-makers seem to regard the PRC as one leg of the global "superpower triangle."2 This study will consider three main topics: China's military-strategic objectives; the actual conduct of military operations; and, finally, what the military results indicate about Chinese military capabilities and prospects.