Multiple Objectives in Monetary Policy: A De Facto Analysis for ‘Advanced’ Countries

A statistical methodology is developed by which realised outcomes can be used to identify, for calendar years between 1974 and 2012, when policymakers in ‘advanced’ economies have successfully pursued single objectives of different kinds, or multiple objectives. A simple criterion is then used to distinguish between multiple objectives pure and simple and multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint. The overall and individual country results which this methodology produces seem broadly plausible. Unconditional and conditional analyses of the inflation and growth associated with different types of objectives reveal that multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint are associated with roughly as good economic performance as the single objective of inflation. A proposal is then made as to how the remit of an inflation-targeting central bank could be adjusted to allow it to pursue other objectives in extremis without losing the credibility effects associated with inflation targeting.

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