A Note on Best Response Dynamics

We investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic, its perturbed version and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria. We find that as the level of noise approaches zero, the perturbed best response dynamic has the same quantitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics. That is, stability properties of equilibria are robust across learning dynamics of quite different origins and motivations.

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