Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Andrew P. Whitmore,et al. Farming, fertilizers and the nitrate problem , 1991 .
[2] Robert E. Goodin. The sustainability ethic : Political, not just moral , 1999 .
[3] B. Solomon. New directions in emissions trading: the potential contribution of new institutional economics , 1999 .
[4] W. Beckerman,et al. The equitable international allocation of tradable carbon emission permits , 1995 .
[5] Brian Kent,et al. Models for conflict resolution in ecosystem management , 1999 .
[6] M. Escapa,et al. Distribution of Potential Gains from International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Greenhouse Effect , 1997 .
[7] Carmen Herrero,et al. The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems , 2001, Math. Soc. Sci..
[8] W. Montgomery,et al. Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs" Journal of Economic Theory , 1972 .
[9] John Norregaard,et al. Taxes and Tradable Permits as Instruments for Controlling Pollution Theory and Practice , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[10] Eric Maskin,et al. Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments , 1999 .
[11] Olivier Godard,et al. Domestic transferable permits for environmental management : design and implementation , 2001 .
[12] Sujata Gupta,et al. An effective allocation criterion for CO2 emissions , 1999 .
[13] S. Farrow. The dual political economy of taxes and tradable permits , 1995 .
[14] H. Groenenberg,et al. Benchmark-based emission allocation in a cap-and-trade system , 2002 .
[15] N. Dagan,et al. The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach , 1993 .
[16] A. Rubinstein,et al. Bargaining and Markets , 1991 .
[17] B. Solomon,et al. International reductions of greenhouse-gas emissions , 1991 .
[18] N. Hanley,et al. Environmental Economics: In Theory and Practice , 1996 .
[19] Marshall A. Wise,et al. International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy , 1998 .
[20] A. Muthoo. Bargaining Theory with Applications , 1999 .
[21] M. Haan,et al. Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction , 2001 .
[22] Steven J. Brams,et al. Fair division - from cake-cutting to dispute resolution , 1998 .
[23] William Thomson,et al. On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..
[24] Ben Rogers. The Nature of Value and the Value of Nature: a Philosophical Overview , 2000 .
[25] R. Lyon,et al. Auctions and Alternative Procedures for Allocating Pollution Rights , 1982 .
[26] Madhu Khanna,et al. Non-mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection , 2002 .
[27] T. Tietenberg. Ethical influences on the evolution of the US tradable permit approach to air pollution control , 1998 .
[28] A. Malik,et al. Markets for Pollution Control when Firms Are Noncompliant , 1990 .
[29] P. Bohm,et al. Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union , 1994 .
[30] Mark Voorneveld,et al. Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games , 2002, Ann. Oper. Res..
[31] P. J. Green,et al. Probability and Statistical Inference , 1978 .
[33] Jeremy Richardson,et al. Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change , 2000 .
[34] A. Whitmore,et al. Modelling the fate of nitrogen in crop and soil in the years following application of 15N-labelled fertilizer to winter wheat , 1993, The Journal of Agricultural Science.
[35] C. Daugbjerg. Policy Networks And Agricultural Policy Reforms: Explaining Deregulation In Sweden And Re‐Regulation In The European Community , 1997 .
[36] Eric Neumayer,et al. In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions , 2000 .
[37] U. Simonis,et al. Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation , 2001, Environmental Values.
[38] Lars R. Bakken,et al. Regulating nonpoint-source pollution from agriculture: An integrated modelling analysis , 1997 .
[39] D. Bromley. Handbook of environmental economics , 1995 .
[40] R. A. England. REDUCING THE NITROGEN INPUT ON ARABLE FARMS , 1986 .
[41] N. Hanley,et al. Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical analysis , 1993 .
[42] Adam Rose,et al. The efficiency and equity of marketable permits for CO2 emissions , 1993 .
[43] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .
[44] Andrew Moxey,et al. Areal Interpolation of Spatially Extensive Variables: A Comparison of Alternative Techniques , 1994, Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Sci..
[45] Philippe Quirion,et al. Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences , 2002 .
[46] T. Cason. Seller Incentive Properties of EPA′s Emission Trading Auction , 1993 .
[47] Vladimir Novotny,et al. Diffuse pollution from agriculture - a worldwide outlook , 1999 .
[48] Robert N. Stavins,et al. What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading , 1998 .
[49] Climis A. Davos,et al. Cooperative Solutions for Sustainable Resource Management , 1999, Environmental management.
[50] Ariel Dinar,et al. Mechanisms for allocation of environmental control cost : Empirical tests of acceptability and stability , 1997 .
[51] J. Bergh. Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics , 1999 .
[52] Éric Montpetit. Policy Networks, Federal Arrangements, and the Development of Environmental Regulations: A Comparison of the Canadian and American Agricultural Sectors , 2002 .
[53] Ben White,et al. EFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH AGRICULTURAL NITRATE POLLUTION STANDARDS , 1994 .
[54] Mark A. Ridgley,et al. Fair sharing of greenhouse gas burdens , 1996 .
[55] Martin Walker,et al. Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards , 1983 .
[56] David Scholefield,et al. Estimating peak nitrate concentrations from annual nitrate loads , 1996 .
[57] Tom Addiscott,et al. SUNDIAL: A PC‐Based System for Simulating Nitrogen Dynamics in Arable Land , 1996 .
[58] Lasse Ringius,et al. Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens?: OECD results from three burden sharing rules , 1998 .
[59] Application of a conceptual catchment scale nitrate transport model on two rural river basins , 1998 .
[60] S. Kverndokk. Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem , 1995, Environmental Values.
[61] D. Scholefield,et al. A model to predict transformations and losses of nitrogen in UK pastures grazed by beef cattle , 1991, Plant and Soil.
[62] Wendong Tao,et al. Tradable Discharge Permit System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China , 2000 .
[63] William Thomson,et al. Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey , 2003, Math. Soc. Sci..
[64] S. Clayton. New Ways of Thinking about Environmentalism: Models of Justice in the Environmental Debate , 2000 .
[65] A. Hallam. The competitive firm's response to risk , 1987 .
[66] Peter Cramton,et al. Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather , 2002 .
[67] Gerrit De Geest,et al. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics , 2000 .
[68] The allocative efficiency implications of water pollution abatement cost comparisons , 1990 .
[69] R. Porter. The long‐run asymmetry of subsidies and taxes as antipollution policies , 1974 .
[70] Scott E. Atkinson,et al. Market Failure in Incentive-Based Regulation: The Case of Emissions Trading* , 1991 .
[71] Zhiqi Chen. Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis , 1997 .
[72] N. Dagan,et al. A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules , 1994 .