On the Relationships between Connection Modes and Workgroup Performance The Moderating Role of Group Size and Task Complexity

Notwithstanding the central place covered inside organization science and the economic theory of the firm, organization design theory still lacks sound building blocks concerning the effects that some fundamental variables have on workgroup performance. In this chapter a contribution to fill in this gap is given with reference to the relationships between connection modes and performance. In particular, through an agent-based simulation model a number of experiments have been done respect to the moderating role played by group size and task complexity. Results confirm current (but not really scientific) knowledge, and bring forth our understanding of these fundamental (and mostly nonlinear) relationships. Among the main results, it can be underlined that the best combinations between connection modes, task complexity, and workgroup size occur when complex tasks are connected by mutual adaptation and run by a small number of agents, or when less complex tasks are connected by parallel or sequential interdependence and performed by a large number of agents. Moreover, when a modules volume to be worked out is heterogeneous in terms of connection modes between module’s tasks, and thus, a multi-mode group should be issued, respect to the corresponding choice of issuing specialized groups there is a general decrease in efficacy.

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