The Effects of Decision Framing and Others' Behavior on Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

In a decision situation, the choice alternatives can be described, or framed, with respect to different reference points, such as gains or losses. This study investigates the effects of decision framing in a social dilemma. Subjects, in groups of four or five persons, participated in a simulated social dilemma. Two factors were manipulated: decision framing (either in terms of giving to a collective good or taking from a collective good), and others' behavior (whether other group members had apparently cooperated a little or a great deal on the first trial). Subjects conformed to others' behavior when they could take from a collective good, but they diffused responsibility and acted contrary to others' behavior when they could give to a public good. These results imply that models of choice behavior in social dilemmas should be expanded to include framing effects, as well as other departures from strict rationality. Moreover, the results suggest that findings from social dilemma research in which subjects can contribute to buy a public good may not be consistent with findings from studies in which subjects can take resources from a common pool.

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