Fair Income Tax

In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure, we look for the optimal tax on the basis of efficiency and fairness principles and under incentive-compatibility constraints. The fairness principles considered here are: 1) a weak version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle; 2) a condition precluding redistribution when all agents have the same skills. With such principles we construct and justify specific social preferences and derive a simple criterion for the evaluation of income tax schedules. Namely, the lower the greatest average tax rate over the range of low incomes, the better. We show that, as a consequence, the optimal tax should give the greatest subsidies to the working poor (the agents having the lowest skill and choosing the largest labor time).

[1]  P. Samuelson,et al.  Foundations of Economic Analysis. , 1948 .

[2]  Yves Sprumont,et al.  Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good , 2004 .

[3]  L. A. Goodman,et al.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[4]  Ronald Dworkin,et al.  What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources , 1981 .

[5]  M. Brewer COMPARING IN - WORK BENEFITS AND FINANCIAL WORK INCENTIVES FOR LOW - INCOME FAMILIES IN THE U , 2000 .

[6]  D. Ellwood The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements , 2000, National Tax Journal.

[7]  J. Mirrlees An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation an Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation L Y 2 , 2022 .

[8]  François Maniquet,et al.  Fair social orderings , 2007 .

[9]  Walter Bossert,et al.  Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis , 1999 .

[10]  Steven A. Matthews,et al.  MONOPOLY PROVISION OF QUALITY AND WARRANTIES: AN EXPLORATION IN THE THEORY OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCREENING , 1987 .

[11]  Optimal demogrants with imperfect tagging , 2002 .

[12]  M. Fleurbaey,et al.  Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation , 1999 .

[13]  M. Fleurbaey,et al.  Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments , 2000 .

[14]  James A. Mirrlees,et al.  Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty , 2006 .

[15]  M. Armstrong Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing , 1996 .

[16]  François Maniquet,et al.  Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills , 2005, Soc. Choice Welf..

[17]  Philippe Choné,et al.  Optimal incentives for labor force participation , 2005 .

[18]  François Maniquet,et al.  Utilitarianism versus fairness in welfare economics , 2007 .

[19]  Kotaro Suzumura,et al.  Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces? , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[20]  J. Rochet,et al.  Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening , 1998 .

[21]  Alain Trannoy,et al.  The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian , 2003, Soc. Choice Welf..

[22]  Stephen Coate,et al.  The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes , 1995 .

[23]  Jesús Seade,et al.  On the shape of optimal tax schedules , 1977 .

[24]  D. Gale,et al.  Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice , 1991 .

[25]  E. Sadka On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation , 1976 .

[26]  U. Ebert A reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax , 1992 .

[27]  François Maniquet,et al.  Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation , 1996 .

[28]  Marc Fleurbaey,et al.  The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense , 2005 .

[29]  Bengt Hansson,et al.  The independence condition in the theory of social choice , 1973 .

[30]  Peter A. Diamond,et al.  Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Comment , 2000 .

[31]  Maurice Marchand,et al.  Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure , 2002 .

[32]  Matti Tuomala Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution , 1990 .

[33]  A. Atkinson Public Economics In Action , 1995 .