AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS

This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.

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