On requirements and security in a CCIS

Any foundation for computer security needs to be tested to see whether it is strong enough to support a useful theory. In this paper a case study is presented which illustrates a particular foundation for confidentiality. A natural language confidentiality requirement is formalized in a calculus of information flow and analysed to assess possible conflicts.<<ETX>>

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