Tactical Level Decision-Making for Platoons of Autonomous Vehicles Using Auction Mechanisms

This paper proposes the application of market-based mechanisms to establish cooperative behavior within traffic scenarios involving autonomous vehicles. The aim is to understand the suitability of commonly used auction rules as a potential mechanism for tactical-level collective decision-making in platoon applications considering near-reliable communications. As a proof of feasibility, two auction clearing rules are compared, namely the first-price and the second-price sealed bid auctions. Both rules are tested according to their impact on coalition welfare and communication. To realistically assess the system performance, we designed an integrated simulation platform composed of an agent-based platform, a microscopic traffic model, and a vehicular network simulator. Results show the viability of two rules to maintain high satisfaction among platoon members, that can lead to stable formations and consequently better traffic conditions. From a communication perspective, a non-negligible delay is present, and should be taken into account when implementing an auctioning mechanism for real-world deployment.