Groups, cooperation and conflict in games

Inter-group and intra-group cooperation and conflict are as important as difficult to understand. We focus on how they can be predicted using simple game harmony measures based purely on material game payoffs, and on situational group factors going beyond strategic incentives and the remit of interdependent preferences models. We discuss the relationship between game harmony, group identity and other related psychological mechanisms, such as team reasoning. Cooperation should vary according to group salience, the degree of common fate, the method of group formation, and mediating factors such as communication and procedural fairness.

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