Strategic commitment to price to stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain

Abstract It is generally in a firm’s interest for its supply chain partners to invest in innovations. To the extent that these innovations either reduce the partners’ variable costs or stimulate demand for the end product, they will tend to lead to higher levels of output for all of the firms in the chain. However, in response to the innovations of its partners, a firm may have an incentive to opportunistically increase its own prices. The possibility of such opportunistic behavior creates a hold-up problem that leads supply chain partners to underinvest in innovation. Clearly, this hold-up problem could be eliminated by a pre-commitment to price. However, by making an advance commitment to price, a firm sacrifices an important means of responding to demand uncertainty. In this paper we examine the trade-off that is faced when a firm’s channel partner has opportunities to invest in either cost reduction or quality improvement, i.e. demand enhancement. Should it commit to a price in order to encourage innovation, or should it remain flexible in order to respond to demand uncertainty. We discuss several simple wholesale pricing mechanisms with respect to this trade-off.

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