Auctions with synergy and resale

We study a sequential auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions: Under the monopoly offer, there does not exist an equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) where bidders reveal their types with positive probability. Under the monopsony offer, however, we can identify symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies in auctions for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, we demonstrate that the effect of resale on expected revenue and the probability of exposure are both ambiguous.

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