Social identity theory: A conceptual and empirical critique from the perspective of a behavioural interaction model

After a conceptual and methodological critique of Social Identity Theory (SIT), it is argued, in sharp contrast to SIT but consistent with a Behavioural Interaction Model (BIM), that the allocations in the standard Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) —which provide the main evidence for SIT— can be best reinterpreted as instrumental, rational behaviour aimed at maximizing the economic self-interests of the subjects rather than efforts on their part to strive for a positive social identity as SIT has claimed. Explicit social categorization appears to be only one of the many unit-forming factors which may affect allocations within and between group boundaries in the MGP. Group polarization effects indicate that groups, guided by their perceived interdependence on the recipients of their allocations seem more rational and effective than their individual members prior to the group discussion in maximizing their economic outcomes. Finally, it is concluded that BIM provides probably a more parsimonious explanation of all the usualfindings obtained by the standard MGP than SIT.

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