Weapons Acquisition Reform: Reform Act is Helping DoD Acquisition Programs Reduce Risk, but Implementation Challenges Remain

Abstract : For several decades, the GAO has reported on poor outcomes encompassing cost and schedule growth on the Department of Defense s (DoD s) major weapon acquisition programs. Many problems can be traced to a culture where the military services begin programs with inflexible requirements, immature technologies, and overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates. Given pressures to reduce spending across the government, including the DoD, finding ways to prevent or mitigate cost growth is crucial to U.S. national security. A solid program foundation using good developmental testing and systems engineering, and reliable cost estimates is needed in order to help avoid cost overruns and promote better acquisition outcomes. There have been numerous attempts in the past to improve DoD acquisition outcomes, including the Packard Commission (President s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986), the Goldwater Nichols Act in the 1980s (1986), and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. More recently, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act)1 to improve the way weapon systems are acquired and avoid cost and schedule overruns. In 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked us to begin reporting on the DoD s implementation of Reform Act provisions and the impact the Reform Act has had on weapon acquisition programs. This is our third report addressing these topics. The first report focused on the DoD s initial efforts to implement Reform Act provisions for systems engineering and developmental testing, including the placement of new offices for these activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD; GAO, 2010). Our second report examined the challenges the Services face as they try to strengthen systems engineering and developmental testing activities on weapon acquisition programs (GAO, 2011b).