Concentrating on Dispersed Operations: Answering the Emerging Antiaccess Challenge in the Pacific Rim

Abstract : Potential adversaries of the United States recognize that its ability to globally project combat power is essential to maintaining military dominance. Degrading US combat power projection requires a strategy of access denial which consists of geopolitical and military measures. In the Pacific Rim, the development of antiaccess capabilities is accelerating. Specifically, China has increased its procurement of ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and diesel submarines with a special focus on anticarrier operations. Although China seems focused on naval forces, the antiaccess challenge affects all services. Since the Pacific Rim continues to emerge as a global region of importance, the United States must implement access-enhancing measures now to optimize its power-projection capability in future operations. The central question for the Air Force centers on how land-based airpower can assist in answering the emerging antiaccess challenge in that region. This is not the first time the United States has faced a significant antiaccess challenge. It encountered a severe challenge from the Soviet Union during the Cold War when confronted with multiple nuclear delivery means that threatened US military forces overseas and stateside. The US answered this antiaccess challenge in a multifaceted approach that, if applied today, would enhance our efforts in the Pacific Rim. First, US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) implemented dispersal plans for US tactical forces in Europe. Second, Strategic Air Command (SAC) put in place an operational concept called Reflex Action, which enhanced the survivability of the long-range bomber force through dispersal and forward-deployed alert operations supported by an early warning system. Third, the successful pursuit of a strategic triad allowed the United States to retain a strategic advantage throughout the Cold War.

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