Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.

[1]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas , 2012, Scientific Reports.

[2]  M. Nowak,et al.  Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. , 2006, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[3]  M. Dufwenberg,et al.  Direct versus indirect reciprocity : An experiment , 2001 .

[4]  H. Ohtsuki,et al.  A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks , 2006, Nature.

[5]  L. Stanca.  Measuring Indirect Reciprocity: Whose Back Do We Scratch? , 2009 .

[6]  Michael Doebeli,et al.  Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game , 2004, Nature.

[7]  G. S. van Doorn,et al.  THE EVOLUTION OF GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY ON SOCIAL INTERACTION NETWORKS , 2012, Evolution; international journal of organic evolution.

[8]  S. Galam,et al.  The role of inflexible minorities in the breaking of democratic opinion dynamics , 2007, physics/0703021.

[9]  Sébastien Roch,et al.  Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude , 2007, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.

[10]  D. E. Matthews.  Evolution and the Theory of Games , 1977 .

[11]  David R. Schaefer,et al.  Building Solidarity through Generalized Exchange: A Theory of Reciprocity1 , 2007, American Journal of Sociology.

[12]  Andrew Michener,et al.  FORMAL MODELS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION , 2022 .

[13]  Stig Stenholm,et al.  On to experiment , 1988, Nature.

[14]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations , 2004, Nature.

[15]  M. Macy,et al.  The false enforcement of unpopular norms. , 2009, AJS; American journal of sociology.

[16]  M. Taborsky,et al.  Contingent movement and cooperation evolve under generalized reciprocity , 2005, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.

[17]  Arne Traulsen,et al.  Human strategy updating in evolutionary games , 2010, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[18]  M. Macy,et al.  The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self‐Enforcing Norms1 , 2005, American Journal of Sociology.

[19]  S. Redner,et al.  On the role of zealotry in the voter model , 2007 .

[20]  Mauro Mobilia,et al.  Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with cooperation facilitators. , 2013, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[21]  R. Axelrod,et al.  Evolutionary Dynamics , 2004 .

[22]  M. Nowak.  Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.

[23]  Mara M. Wenzler.  The Role of Social Networks , 2010 .

[24]  B. Greiner,et al.  Indirect Reciprocity in Cyclical Networks - An Experimental Study - , 2005 .

[25]  L. Blume.  The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction , 1993 .

[26]  Rosemarie Nagel,et al.  Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[27]  M. Mobilia.  Does a single zealot affect an infinite group of voters? , 2003, Physical review letters.

[28]  J. Coleman.  FREE RIDERS AND ZEALOTS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS , 1988 .

[29]  Karen S. Cook,et al.  Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas , 1993 .

[30]  Krishnendu Chatterjee,et al.  Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners. , 2012, Journal of theoretical biology.

[31]  M. Dufwenberg,et al.  Direct vs Indirect Reciprocity: An Experiment , 2000 .

[32]  Naoki Masuda,et al.  Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks. , 2009, Journal of theoretical biology.

[33]  Nicholas A. Christakis,et al.  Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks , 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[34]  Armin Falk,et al.  A Theory of Reciprocity , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[35]  Boleslaw K. Szymanski,et al.  Social consensus through the influence of committed minorities , 2011, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[36]  C. Lumsden.  Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Robert Boyd, Peter J. Richerson. University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London (1985), viii, +301. Price $29.95 , 1986 .

[37]  Daniel J. Rankin,et al.  Assortment and the Evolution of Generalized Reciprocity , 2009, Evolution; international journal of organic evolution.

[38]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[39]  Naoki Masuda,et al.  Clustering in Large Networks Does Not Promote Upstream Reciprocity , 2011, PloS one.

[40]  P. Richerson,et al.  The evolution of indirect reciprocity , 1989 .

[41]  G. Szabó,et al.  Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice , 1997, cond-mat/9710096.

[42]  Zoltán Barta,et al.  Cooperation among non-relatives evolves by state-dependent generalized reciprocity , 2011, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.

[43]  Boleslaw K. Szymanski,et al.  Accelerating consensus on co-evolving networks: the effect of committed individuals , 2011, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[44]  R. Sugden.  The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare , 1986 .