Normative Models of Judgment and Decision Making

The study of judgment and decision making (JDM) is traditionally concerned with the comparison of judgments to standards, standards that allow evaluation of the judgments as better or worse. I use the term “judgments” to include decisions, which are judgments about what to do. The major standards come from probability theory, utility theory, and statistics. These are mathematical theories or “models” that allow us to evaluate a judgment. They are called normative because they

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