Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

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