论文信息 - The Shapley Value on a Class of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information

The Shapley Value on a Class of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information

In this paper, we study cooperative TU games in which the worths of some coalitions are not known. We investigate superadditive games and the Shapley values on a class of cooperative games under incomplete information. We show that the set of the superadditive complete games and the set of the Shapley values which can be obtained from a given incomplete game are polytopes and propose selection methods of the one-point solution from the set of the Shapley values.

Satoshi Masuya | Satoshi Masuya

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