Belief in information flow

Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, a model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.

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