Attribution in conversational context: Effect of mutual knowledge on explanation‐giving

Attribution theorists typically have conceived the attribution process in terms of universal laws of cognitive functioning, independent of social interaction. In this paper we argue for the notion, grounded in recent ordinary language philosophy, that any consideration of the form of everyday explanation must take into account its function as an answer to a ‘why’ question within a conversational framework. Experiment 1 provides support for the idea that speakers should identify as causally relevant that necessary condition for the occurrence of an event about which the enquirer is ignorant. Experiment 2 replicates this basic finding and further demonstrates that speakers will change their explanations to enquirers believed to be sharing different knowledge about the same target event. Experiment 2 also assessed the role of individual differences in conversational rule-following, and found in apparent contrast some previous predictions that high self-monitoring individuals were no more likely than lows to tailor their explanations to suit the enquirer's knowledge state. If anything, the reverse occurred. Taken together, these experiments support the central contention of the abnormal conditions focus model (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986), that the common sense criterion of causality is that of an ‘abnormal condition’ rather than constant conjunction as instantiated in the ANOVA model of causal attribution (Kelley, 1967, 1973).