Preserving ( Security ) Properties under Action Refinement ?

In the design process of distributed systems we may have to replace abstract specifications of components by more concrete specifications, thus providing more detailed design information. In the context of process algebra this well-known approach is often referred to as action refinement. In this paper we study the relationships between action refinement, compositionality, and (security) process properties within the Security Process Algebra (SPA). We formalize the concept of action refinement both as a structural inductive definition and in terms of subsequent context compositions. We study compositional properties of our notion of refinement and provide conditions under which general process properties are preserved through it. Finally, we consider information flow security properties and define decidable classes of secure terms which are closed under action refinement.

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