The Construction of Knowledge in Organizations: Asking the Right Questions about the Challenger

Previous research on the communication failures contributing to the Challenger's explosion tends to ask why it happened that various people in the organizations involved knew about the faulty O-rings but failed to pass on the information to decision makers. This is a faulty question, revealing assump tions many of us unconsciously share even when we consciously reject these as sumptions. This question implies a simplistic notion of knowledge and a conduit model of communication. Insights from the sociology of technology and the new rhetoricians can help us to form better questions about rhetoric in organizations.

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