Feedback and Incentives on Nonfinancial Value Drivers: Effects on Managerial Decision Making*

This paper examines how adding leading non-financial value drivers to a lagging summary financial measure affects managerial decision making in firms where either intangible assets (intangible assets firm) or tangible assets (tangible assets firm) are more important for future financial performance. Using an experiment, I compare a control performance evaluation system (PES) with feedback and incentives on only a summary financial measure to a PES with added feedback on non-financial measures and a PES with added feedback and incentives on non-financial measures. I find that managers increase their decision quality more in the intangible assets firm than in the tangible assets firm when both feedback and incentives on non-financial measures are added, but not when only feedback on non-financial measures is added. Early in the experiment, managers of the intangible assets firm do not make better decisions with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures, but do so with the further adding of incentives on non-financial measures. However, managers of the intangible assets firm improve their decisions over time with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures. On the other hand, managers of the tangible assets firm do not make better decisions with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures nor with the further adding of incentives on non-financial measures. The results suggest that the benefits of adding non-financial value drivers may vary based on a firm's dependency on tangible versus intangible assets, and on whether the non-financial value drivers are explicitly rewarded in the incentive contract.

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