The traveler's dilemma: Paradoxes of rationality in game theory
暂无分享，去创建一个
[1] M. Dufwenberg,et al. Inconsistencies in extensive games , 1996 .
[2] P. Reny. Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information , 1993 .
[3] Robert W. Rosenthal,et al. A NOTE ON ABREU-MATSUSHIMA MECHANISMS , 1992 .
[4] Larry Samuelson,et al. “Cautious” utility maximization and iterated weak dominance , 1992 .
[5] J. Weibull,et al. Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior , 1991 .
[6] Giacomo Bonanno,et al. The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information , 1991, Economics and Philosophy.
[7] K. Basu,et al. On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games , 1990 .
[8] Cristina Bicchieri,et al. Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge , 1989 .
[9] Ken Binmore,et al. Modeling Rational Players: Part II , 1987, Economics and Philosophy.
[10] Ken Binmore,et al. Modeling Rational Players: Part I , 1987, Economics and Philosophy.
[11] Michael Taylor. The possibility of cooperation , 1987 .
[12] Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang,et al. Common knowledge and game theory , 1986 .
[13] Amartya Sen,et al. Goals, Commitment, and Identity , 1985 .
[14] David M. Kreps,et al. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .
[15] R. Rosenthal. Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox , 1981 .
[16] R. Selten. The chain store paradox , 1978 .