Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting

We develop an auction system that determines a fair number of komi for holding black stones in a GO game between two players of equal strength, and hence the right to the first move. It is modeled as a priority right pricing problem that demands for budget-balanced and egalitarian conditions, where a negative utility is associated with the losers. We establish results involved with the incentive compatible properties for this problem under both deterministic and randomized protocols.

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