Perfect competition vs. strategic behaviour models to derive electricity prices and the influence of renewables on market power

A variety of fundamental modelling approaches exist using different competition concepts with and without strategic behaviour to derive electricity prices. To investigate the quality and practicability of these different approaches in energy economics, a perfect competition model, a Cournot model and a Bilevel model are introduced and applied to different situations in the German electricity market. The three electricity market approaches are analysed with respect to their ability to represent electricity prices and the possibility of market power abuse. Market prices are taken as a benchmark for model validity. As a result, the perfect competition model fits best to today’s market situation in most hours of the year. The Bilevel approach explains prices in high load hours sometimes better than the competition model. But complexity and calculation time increase disproportionately. In addition to the analysis of model quality, we use three scenarios to quantify how a high renewable feed-in influences the ability to abuse market power. Results show that the ability to address market power strongly depends on the amount of installed capacities.

[1]  Massimo Genoese,et al.  Market power in the German wholesale electricity market , 2009 .

[2]  M. Genoese,et al.  The merit-order effect: A detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in Germany , 2008 .

[3]  W. Fichtner,et al.  A combined modeling approach for wind power feed-in and electricity spot prices , 2013 .

[4]  Derek W. Bunn,et al.  Agent-based simulation-an application to the new electricity trading arrangements of England and Wales , 2001, IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput..

[5]  D. Wozabal,et al.  Measuring competitiveness of the EPEX spot market for electricity , 2013 .

[6]  Impacts of the German Support for Renewable Energy on Electricity Prices, Emissions, and Firms , 2009 .

[7]  R. Green,et al.  Market behaviour with large amounts of intermittent generation , 2010 .

[8]  Martinez Diaz,et al.  Production Cost Models With Regard To Liberalised Electricity Markets , 2008 .

[9]  Steven A. Gabriel,et al.  Solving discretely-constrained MPEC problems with applications in electric power markets , 2010 .

[10]  Christian von Hirschhausen,et al.  Price Formation and Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market in 2006 , 2008 .

[11]  Makoto Tanaka,et al.  Market power in renewable portfolio standards , 2013 .

[12]  E. Read,et al.  Modelling hydro reservoir operation in a deregulated electricity market , 1996 .

[13]  James Bushnell,et al.  Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets , 2005 .

[14]  Iain Staffell,et al.  Divide and Conquer? ${k}$-Means Clustering of Demand Data Allows Rapid and Accurate Simulations of the British Electricity System , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management.

[15]  E. Kahn,et al.  A quantitative analysis of pricing behavior in California's wholesale electricity market during summer 2000 , 2001, 2001 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37262).

[16]  Felix Müsgens,et al.  Quantifying Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market Using a Dynamic Multi-Regional Dispatch Model , 2006 .

[17]  Christopher R. Knittel,et al.  Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market , 2004 .

[18]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  Nonlinear Programming , 1997 .

[19]  M. Ventosa,et al.  Electricity market modeling trends , 2005 .

[20]  Catherine D. Wolfram,et al.  Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market , 1999 .

[21]  C. Weber Uncertainty in the electric power industry , 2004 .

[22]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Linear Complementarity Models of Nash-Cournot Competition in Bilateral and POOLCO Power Markets , 2001, IEEE Power Engineering Review.

[23]  Anmerkungen zu empirischen Analysen der Preisbildung am deutschen Spotmarkt für Elektrizität : Gutachten , 2007 .

[24]  Richard Green,et al.  Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it wrong? , 2007 .

[25]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets , 2012 .

[26]  Claudia Kemfert,et al.  Gone with the Wind? Electricity Market Prices and Incentives to Invest in Thermal Power Plants under Increasing Wind Energy Supply , 2009 .

[27]  S. Borenstein,et al.  Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market , 2002 .

[28]  José Fortuny-Amat,et al.  A Representation and Economic Interpretation of a Two-Level Programming Problem , 1981 .

[29]  S. Granville,et al.  Nash equilibrium in strategic bidding: a binary expansion approach , 2006, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.