THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARTISAN INTERESTS AND NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS IN ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHANGE. HUNGARY IN 2014

Academic literature is divided about the importance of the normative versus the partisan background of electoral system change. While concerns regarding the former electoral system were justified in Hungary the article argues that the actual reform dominantly followed partisan interests and even neglected normative concerns. Applying the approach of the Electoral Integrity Project the analysis of various aspects, like the electoral law itself, electoral procedures, voter registration, party and candidate registration, media coverage, campaign finance, voting process, vote count, and the role of electoral authorities demonstrates that Hungary’s ranking is strikingly low for almost every element, often ranking last from a comparative perspective. The new electoral system is a building block in the construction of a predominant party system.

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