Buyer-Supplier Relationships and Trade Credit

We create a database of supplier firms' principal customers from Compustat's Business Information File and examine the impact of principal customers on the provision of trade credit. The supplier firms' accounts receivable scaled by sales decreases in the proportion of sales accounted for by principal customers. This is consistent with the financing advantage or price-discrimination theories of trade credit, but less consistent with theories that view trade credit as a general subsidy to all customers to promote sales, as a guarantee of product quality, or as a manifestation of customer bargaining power. The underlying relationship, however, is non-linear, suggesting that transactions motives also affect trade credit. Long-term principal customers pay more promptly when the suppliers are in financial distress, suggesting the value of durable relationships. Accounts payable are also affected by the proportion of sales to principal customers - which suggests that firms match the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities by letting payables policy be determined, in part, by their receivables. Bigger firms offer more trade credit and also pay more promptly: a proportionate increase in sales and asset size increases accounts receivable more than proportionately, and accounts payable less than proportionately. Both accounts receivable and accounts payable are affected by the supplier firm's inventory, leverage, cash flows and profit margin in a manner that is mainly consistent with the financing advantage, the price-discrimination and the transactions cost theories.

[1]  W. Choi,et al.  Trade Credit and the Effect of Macro-Financial Shocks : Evidence From U.S. Panel Data , 2003 .

[2]  Chee K. Ng,et al.  Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Terms Used in Interfirm Trade , 1999 .

[3]  M. Petersen,et al.  The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data , 1994 .

[4]  Murray Z. Frank,et al.  Trade Credit, Collateral, and Adverse Selection , 2005 .

[5]  Benjamin S. Wilner The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of Trade Credit , 2000 .

[6]  Robert A. Schwartz,et al.  An Economic Model of Trade Credit , 1974, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[7]  S. Abraham Ravid,et al.  Trade Credit, Quality Guarantees, and Product Marketability , 1993 .

[8]  Janet Kiholm Smith Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry , 1987 .

[9]  Clifford W. Smith,et al.  Accounts Receivable Management Policy: Theory and Evidence , 1992 .

[10]  John D. Stowe,et al.  Product Risk, Asymmetric Information, and Trade Credit , 1993, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[11]  Gary W. Emery An Optimal Financial Response to Variable Demand , 1987, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[12]  Bruno Biais,et al.  Trade Credit and Credit Rationing , 1997 .

[13]  J. Nilsen,et al.  Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel , 2002 .

[14]  Gary W. Emery A Pure Financial Explanation for Trade Credit , 1984, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[15]  J. Stephen Ferris,et al.  A Transactions Theory of Trade Credit Use , 1981 .

[16]  M. Petersen,et al.  Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence , 1996 .

[17]  Manohar U. Kalwani,et al.  Long-Term Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships: Do They Pay off for Supplier Firms? , 1995 .