Cryptographic Adversary Model: Timing and Power Attacks

In this work, we present an adversary model that incorporates side channel attacks in the Indistinguishability Experiment for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2). We propose security assumptions and an attack model for a secure SSW-ARQ protocol with an integration of TFTP protocol. We also present the security reduction of SSW-ARQ protocol from Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, timing and power attacks as side channel security for the SSW-ARQ protocol. We suggest using a lightweight symmetric encryption for data encryption and asymmetric encryption for key exchange protocols in the TFTP. The target implementation of secure TFTP is for embedded devices such as Wi-Fi Access Points (AP) and remote Base Stations (BS). In this paper we present the security proofs based on an attack model (IND-CCA2) for securing TFTP protocol. We have also introduce a novel adversary model in IND-CCA2-(TA, PA, TPA) and it is considered a practical model because the model incorporates the timing attack and power attack.