Taxation and Development

∗Chapter prepared for the Handbook of Public Economics, edited by Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein, and Emmanuel Saez. We are grateful to Mohammad Vesal for superb research assistance. We also thank Alan Auerbach, Roger Gordon, Anders Jensen, Henrik Kleven, Laszlo Sandor, Joel Slemrod and participants at the Berkeley Conference in December 2011 for comments. Financial support from the ERC, and the Torsten and Ragnar Söderberg Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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