论文信息 - A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

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