论文信息 - Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes - 字舞流文

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Salvador Barberà | Alejandro Neme | S. Barberà | Jordi Massó | A. Neme | Jordi Massò

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