论文信息 - On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem - 字舞流文

On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem

Abstract The core of a linear assignment problem contains a continuum of allocations. A model is presented where this core shrinks to a unique solution of the limit problem as the number of agents grows.

Ulrich Kamecke | U. Kamecke

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